The Olympics and the doping allegations surrounding Chinese swimmers have sparked much debate. Yet, few have delved deeply into the case as I have over the years, scrutinizing publicly available documents. Even fewer understand the facts, so let’s begin by laying those out.

The most comprehensive overview of WADA’s handling of this case is detailed in their Fact Sheet, released in April 2024, along with WADA’s statement on the case involving 23 Chinese swimmers.

Between January 1-3, 2021, 201 swimmers from across the globe competed in Shijiazhuang City, China, at a national long course swim meet. The China Anti-Doping Agency (CHINADA) oversaw the testing of athletes, collecting 60 urine samples during the event. Of these, 28 samples returned Adverse Analytical Findings (AAFs), testing positive for trimetazidine (TMZ), a heart medication banned by WADA. These findings implicated 23 Chinese swimmers, with some testing positive multiple times.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, CHINADA delayed reporting the AAFs until March 2021, almost three months after the competition, submitting their findings to WADA.

It was not until three and a half months later that an investigative team was dispatched, including a visit to the hotel where the athletes had stayed. WADA, however, was excluded from this investigation, with the Chinese authorities citing Covid-related travel restrictions. CHINADA conducted only part of the investigation, excluding the hotel where contamination might have occurred. Instead, CHINADA reported that Chinese State Security Services investigated the hotel, discovering traces of TMZ in the kitchen, around the sink, and in air vents.

In April 2021, CHINADA concluded that the AAFs were likely the result of contamination from an unknown source rather than intentional doping. Several factors supported this conclusion: all AAFs occurred simultaneously, the levels of TMZ were low, those affected came from various regions and represented different teams, and some athletes tested both positive and negative within hours. Moreover, traces of TMZ were found in the hotel kitchen, and the only three athletes not staying at the hotel did not test positive.

In June 2021, CHINADA submitted their final report to WADA, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to pursue an Anti-Doping Rule Violation (ADRV) against any of the athletes.

WADA reviewed the case with an external legal team and consulted World Aquatics (formerly FINA). Both supported CHINADA’s findings and agreed that an ADRV case should not proceed.

In 2022, however, the International Testing Agency (ITA) alerted WADA to a tip-off suggesting that the Chinese samples had been tampered with. Due to the confidentiality concerns surrounding the whistleblower, limited information was made public. WADA ultimately found “no evidence whatsoever that the sample results had been manipulated or wrongly reported. Rather, the evidence clearly showed that the results had been properly reported by CHINADA.” The ITA, an independent organization established in 2018 following the Sochi/Russian doping scandal, disagreed with WADA’s conclusions, and their investigation remains open.

In 2023, USADA informed WADA that they had received information alleging that these cases had been concealed, with the informant claiming to have evidence. WADA requested further details from USADA, but none were provided. Despite this, WADA refused USADA’s request to interview the informants.

Finally, in April 2024, WADA publicly addressed the case during a press conference:

While I cannot definitively state whether the Chinese athletes were guilty of doping or were victims of contamination, several red flags raise concerns about the integrity of this case and WADA’s reliance on CHINADA’s assurances.

First, WADA cited the low levels of TMZ detected in the athletes, noting that “all the positive results were within a tight range at low or very low concentrations,” insufficient to enhance performance. However, TMZ has a half-life of 6-8 hours, is typically undetectable after 12 hours by current testing methods, and is almost completely eliminated from the body within 24 hours. An athlete could potentially ingest TMZ shortly after a morning test, compete with the drug still in their system, and test again later in the day, producing only trace amounts. The challenge of detection could be further complicated by simple tactics like hydrating excessively between tests to dilute the urine.

This scenario is reminiscent of the revelations from cycling’s doping scandals that emerged around 2013. EPO, a common performance-enhancing drug among cyclists, has a similar half-life of 5-7 hours. Cyclists discovered that micro-dosing EPO provided a significant boost while being undetectable just hours later, yet still offering lasting benefits. Athletes, therefore, strategically timed their use of EPO to avoid detection, a loophole in testing that led to the development of the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) by the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) in 2008. The ABP monitors biological markers over time, indirectly revealing the effects of doping rather than detecting the substance itself.

However, TMZ does not have lasting effects detectable through ABP, rendering such a method ineffective in identifying TMZ use.

Moreover, the exclusion of WADA officials from the investigation raises serious concerns. While the Covid-related travel restrictions of the time might justify this decision, the involvement of China’s State Security Services in the on-site investigation is particularly troubling.

China’s State Security Services comprise three primary organizations. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is China’s main civilian intelligence, counterintelligence, and national security agency, responsible for both domestic and foreign intelligence operations, counterespionage, and political security. The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) focuses on cyber warfare, space operations, electronic warfare, and information operations. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is primarily responsible for policing and law enforcement but also plays a significant role in domestic security, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence. Lastly, the Central Military Commission (CMC) oversees the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its intelligence and security operations.

Imagine the global reaction if USADA employed the combined powers of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and DNI to investigate doping allegations in U.S. Cycling, and then cleared the athletes based on evidence found by these agencies.

This is essentially what transpired in this case. These entities discovered a critical piece of evidence—the presence of TMZ in the hotel kitchen—nearly three months after the alleged contamination.

The involvement of these organizations becomes even more concerning in light of the Russian state-sponsored doping scandal, where the Federal Security Service (FSB) played a pivotal role in manipulating athletes’ urine samples. According to whistleblower Grigory Rodchenkov, former head of the Moscow Anti-Doping Laboratory, FSB agents were instrumental in swapping “dirty” urine samples containing banned substances with clean ones through a hidden hole in the laboratory wall in Sochi. The FSB ensured the smooth execution of this operation, monitored the process, and prevented any information leaks. They also surveilled individuals involved in the doping program, including those in anti-doping roles, ensuring constant monitoring to deter whistleblowing.

What other undisclosed roles might these security services have played in the Chinese case?

With these questions in mind, Pan Zhanle’s remarkable performance at the Olympics warrants closer scrutiny. Undoubtedly, he is one of the greatest 100m swimmers in history, whether or not PEDs were involved. He was the clear favorite to win gold in Paris. What stands out, however, is how dominant his performance was compared to previous world record holders. I’ve created a short video analyzing just how extraordinary his achievement was.

And before accusations arise that questioning Pan Zhanle’s performance is rooted in racism, let me clarify that I’ve been equally critical of the white European cyclists in this (and last year’s) Tour de France, who shattered long-standing records, some over 15 years old, on the most iconic climbs in France.

Ultimately, WADA concluded “that there was no concrete basis to challenge the asserted contamination.” This conclusion relies solely on CHINADA’s findings, supported by China’s Security Services, with no independent investigation by WADA. WADA’s role was limited to reviewing the Chinese investigation’s methodology based on what was reported. The WADA watchdog group, the ITA, disagreed with WADA’s final assessment, and for them, the case remains unresolved.

Finally, let’s address the assertion that questioning this incident is “racist.” It is not. This argument is often used to stifle legitimate inquiries. There were no cries of racism when Spain faced scrutiny during their doping scandal, Operation Puerto. When numerous athletes from any nation test positive for AAFs, particularly in a single sport at the same time, it’s imperative to ask questions. When WADA is excluded from the investigation, and a national anti-doping association’s findings are the only evidence available, further questions are essential. When government security and intelligence services discover the key evidence that exonerates the athletes, a multitude of questions must be asked.